Personal Identity: A Comparison of Philosophies
Emily DeSantis

Every morning, people awake and start their day, never
questioning whether they are the same person as yesterday.
Putting into doubt this automatic assumption about one's own
identity initially sounds foolish. Surely everyone has their own
sense of uniqueness that remains constant throughout time?
But what does this mean and how do we know that this
assumption is true? Descartes, Locke, and Hume all have
different conclusions concerning these questions. Each
philosopher's argument for or against the existence of personal
identity rests on one (of two) models for gaining true
knowledge. A close inspection of the strengths and weaknesses
of these arguments will suggest that (with modifications)
Descartes' explanation of knowledge through reason provides
the most plausible account for personal identity.

It is important to begin by understanding the
differences between rationalism and empiricism; two models of
epistemology that address the way in which concepts originate
and knowledge can be gained. Rationalists like Descartes
believe that concepts originate in "pure reason, thought, [and]
intellect "

They claim that information learned from reason is

more reliable and valuable than information collected by
potentially deceiving senses. Empiricists, however, believe that
knowledge can originate from the senses only. Both Locke's
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and Hume's arguments concerning personal identity are based
on the conviction that concepts originate in experiences and
that such data provides a much firmer foundation for
knowledge than reason.
Again, Descartes is a rationalist who believes that
knowledge originates from reason and introspection, not from
unreliable senses. In other words, he believes in innate
knowledge or ideas, including ideas about the existence of God
and the self. After doubting the existence of everything, he
finally pronounced, ''I am, I exist," soon recognizing that
thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me .... this is

cc

certain." 2 This means that what fundamentally makes a person
a person is his/her mind, the ((thinking thing," which, according
to Descartes, exists separately from the body. Descartes
sometimes refers to this thinking mind as the soul or mental
substance. Personal identity is recognized because people are
able to distinguish their thinking thing from another person 's
thinking thing. Descartes would say that one has a clear and
distinct perception of only oneself such that there would be no
other person with whom to confuse one 's identity. He would
say, eelam; aware of myself as a unique particular substance-an
individual thinking thing. "3 Thus, the mind stays constant
although thought undoubtedly changes.
Descartes' argument raises questions about one 's
continued existence during sleep, and about his confidence
concerning the distinction of our mental substances (how
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exactly do we make these distinctions?). In the first ca e,
Descartes' philosophy is that it implies that, if a person is
essentially a thinking thing, then that person ceases to exist
when he/ she is not thinking, unconscious, or sleeping.
Intuitively, this seems wrong. It creates a gap in personal
identity, for how is one to know that they are the same person
before and after sleeping? In the second case, if the mind stays
the same and only thoughts change, then it can be argued that
everyone has the same mental substance, making personal
identity impossible. These issues are further addressed later in
the paper.
In response to these weaknesses, Locke primarily argues
that (1) there is no such thing as mental substance, and (2)
personal identity is defined, not by thinking, but by having the
sameness of memories. His empiricist philosophy leads Locke
to claim that no knowledge is innate: we are "blank slates" at
birth. People obtain information through sensation and
reflection. It is this act of reflection or memory that, when
coupled with present sensations, leads to the existence of a
personal identity. Locke believes that persons are identified by
their recognition of the sameness of their own memories, since
no two people can share the same memory. A person is a
"thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and
that can consider itself the same thinking thing in different
times and places. "4 This explains why a person remains the
same person from day to day, regardless of his/her loss of
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consc10usness. In response to Descartes' claims concerning th
existence of a constant mental substance, Locke proposes that
"consciousness is 'interrupted' [but] persons are not interrupte
[Therefore,] persons are not identified by consciousness" and,
thus, not in terms of mental substance. 5 In other words,
because matter changes, mental substance would have to chan

1

also. This would not be consistent with the existence of
personal identity, because persons remain the same. The abilit
to assign personal identity easily, without looking to "mental
substance" is further justified by the need for moral
requirement.

In other words, without a clear notion of persom

identity, it would be difficult to assign responsibility and
punish wrongdoers.
The shortcomings of Locke's argument include his
inability to explain or account for memories that people forget
or even pseudo-memories that people create on their own. Thi :
philosophy implies that people could change their identity by
forgetting that they sent a birthday card, or if they thought
they had sent a birthday card but failed to do so in actuality.
Moreover, Locke reveals that we (in this life) can not even be
sure that we are defining 'person' and 'personal identity '

correctly. He believes that there is a fact about personal
identity (as it's a definitive fact of the matter), but this fact will
not be wholly revealed before judgment day.
Hume is also an empiricist, but unlike Locke, he
concludes that there is no concept of the self. Hume's
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philosophy is based on gaining knowledge through experiences.
These experiences create impressions that may be recollected.

:d.

Because persons are composed of bundles of impressions that
lack continued and distinct existence, Hume asserts that there
is no stable underlying impression that can support a constant

ge

personal identity. A summarized form of Hume's argument
states that a meaningful idea of personal identity (like any

y

meaningful idea) must correspond to an impression. But the
idea of the self would have to correspond to an invariant
impression, and the lack of continued and distinct existence of

tl

impressions rules this out. Therefore, the idea of personal
identity is not meaningful.

6

Hume's rejection of the existence of personal identity
solves some inadequacies found in Descartes' and Locke's
arguments by disclaiming the notion of the self all together,
however, his philosophy is not only intuitively difficult to
accept, but the idea of moral responsibility is rendered
unjustifiable. Yet, Hume concedes that, although irrational and
unjustified, belief in the self is natural and can be attributed to a
certain way in which humans are constituted.
Returning to Descartes' inability to explain the
existence of a person ("the thinking thing") during sleep, we
should note that he appears to introduce the notion of a soul,
which would help solve this problem. Pending refinements, this
notion seems to provide a reasonable foundation for the belief
in personal identity based on reason. A soul should refer to, but
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not be confined to, Descartes' definition of a consciously
thinking immaterial mind. A soul should be simply an
immaterial mind, whether it is thinking at the moment or not.
This definition of a soul would account for the ability of some
one to fall asleep and awake as the same person because they
would retain the same soul.
The other objection to Descartes' argument concerned
his use of (mind' to refer to a mental substance. This way, all
thoughts (thinking) could be considered modes of the same
substance as suggested by Spinoza. Everyone would have the
same mental substance, just different modes of thought.
Consequently, the existence of personal identity would be
nullified. But one could imagine, for example, each person
being given a mound of clay and being permitted to shape it as
they willed. Of course, some shapes would be similar but none
would be an exact replicate of another. The clay represents the
mental substance while the shaping of the clay represents the
thinking of each individual. It may be argued that a soul is like
a shaped piece of clay. It is not the substance that makes each
person unique, but the way in which the substance is used, or
thinks.
This reinterpreted version of soul (which is neither
strictly rational or empirical) is helpful in defending the
existence of personal identity. It can be retained in and out of
consciousness, it need not require a good memory, and it still
provides justification for moral responsibility.
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